










In this paper, we study the stationary and non-stationary equilibria of a deter-
ministic, pure exchange, two-period overlapping generations model with habit
persistence. We show that preferences with multiplicative habits can lead to
quite dierent equilibrium outcomes compared to subtractive ones. The two
most commonly adopted habit specications can dier in terms of homothetic-
ity, gross substitutability, and intertemporal marginal rates of substitution. We
study the dierences in savings behavior across the two with respect to steady
state equilibria, indeterminacy, and local dynamics.
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11 Introduction
Understanding how optimal savings decisions change according to dierent preference speci-
cations is of paramount importance since consumption and saving decisions are essential for
both short- and long-run macroeconomic analysis. In the short run, spending dynamics are
crucial for business cycle analysis and the management of monetary policy. And in the long
run, aggregate saving determines the aggregate capital stock, with consequences for wages,
interest rates, and the standard of living.
A recent strand of the economic literature has analyzed theoretical and empirical implica-
tions of endogenous preferences, that is preferences that depend on time, personal experience,
or social conditions. Among the dierent forms of endogenous preferences those displaying
habits have received particular attention.
One of the rst works1 explicitly addressing habits is Pollak [17] which shows that when
past consumption choices aect current ones, so that preferences are \intertemporally de-
pendent," the long-run and short-run demand functions dier. Becker and Murphy [3], in
their seminal paper, employ habits in consumption to study addiction. As a result of habit
persistence, apparently irrational behavior can be explained using rational choice theory.
Habits have also been explored in the economic growth literature. In particular, Ryder
and Heal [18] consider habit persistence in a growth model and show that the optimal path
can be quite dierent with capital overshooting the equilibrium value before settling down
to its steady state. Carroll and Weil [9], on the other hand, consider the eect of a negative
shock to capital in an endogenous growth model with habit persistence and show how savings
and growth rates temporarily fall in response to the shock.
Departures from standard preferences have helped explain some important economic
phenomena, such as the equity premium puzzle. Abel [1] and Constantinides [12] show
how the equity premia predicted by habit formation models are as large as the historical
observations in the United States.
The literature on habit persistence species preferences either using subtractive (SH) or
multiplicative habits (MH), according to the terminology introduced by Carroll [7].2 Even
1Adam Smith in his Theory of Moral Sentiments [19] was probably the rst to suggest the notion
of internal habit persistence. He did so by introducing the concept of \customary" consumption levels.
Households are used to a certain amount of consumption and over time they may then derive less and less
utility from the same constant level of consumption.
2Some examples of MH are Abel [1] and Carroll, Overland, and Weil [10] and for SH, Campbell and
2though habits have helped shed some light on economic phenomena, there has not been
much attention paid to the economic consequences of these two alternative formulations. For
example, Abel [1] and Constantinides [12] reach similar conclusions using the two alternative
formulations. This may seem to suggest, prima facie, that the qualitative properties of models
with SH and MH are pretty similar. As a matter of fact, this is the main nding of Bunzel
[5]. However, Wendner [21], shows that the two most commonly used habit specications
may easily come to opposite implications regarding household savings behavior. He shows
that in response to an increase in the strength of habits, young households may increase
savings in the case of SH, while they may lower savings in the case of MH. Furthermore,
Carroll [7] points out that under plausible parameters SH may give rise to a not well dened
utility in stochastic environments. Thus further anlaysis is warranted.
The objective of this paper is to examine the dierences between the two alternative
formulations adopted in the literature. We explore the consequences of specifying dierent
forms of habit in terms of multiplicity of steady states, dynamic indeterminacy, and local
dynamics in a pure exchange, two-period lived overlapping generations model. Habit per-
sistence in this setting has been previously explored in the literature. Lahiri and Puhakka
[16] consider subtractive habits in a pure exchange overlapping generations framework and
show that increasing the strength of habits raises desired savings and endogenous cycles
are possible. In a similar framework, Bunzel [5] argues that both SH and MH yield results
that are qualitatively very similar. If the choice of how to model savings behavior in the
presence of habits is not innocuous, the predictions and policy prescriptions based on the
two types of habit persistence modeling choices could be quite dierent. An investigation of
the underlying properties of the savings function under the two habit formulations is very
relevant.
The main result of our paper is to show that modeling preferences with MH or SH
yields predictions that are not necessarily equivalent. In contrast to Bunzel [5], the class
of preferences we consider (HARA) is more general and subject to less criticism than the
one she adopts (CRRA).3 Furthermore, we do not restrict agents to have zero endowments
Cochrane [6] and Constantinides [12].
3Carroll [7] p. 68 states that: "CRRA utility in combination with the subtractive formulation...has
several theoretical problems, the gravest of which is that for microeconomically plausible parameterizations
of consumption variation the equation [of consumption] accumulation can easily lead to a zero or negative
argument to the [utility] function...generating innite negative utility.
3when old. Even when we do so, we nd multiple steady states under MH while unique
steady state under SH. Moreover, we show that modeling habit persistence with MH may
not always yield concave or homothetic preferences over consumption. This modeling choice
can give rise to multiple monetary equilibria. Therefore, endogenous volatility and stationary
sunspots equilibria may arise. Moreover, the stability properties of an economy with MH
change drastically as we vary the strength of habits. Thus the the resulting qualitative
properties of the economy under SH and MH can be quite dierent.
In the next section, we introduce the general model with MH and SH and study the
corresponding concavity and homotheticity properties of these preferences. Then, we analyze
the steady state equilibria and their associated dynamics. We also give a general result on
the dierence in the dynamics under the classical case. Finally, we turn to some numerical
exercises that suggest -once again- non negligible discrepancies in the local stability properties
of the steady states across MH and SH. The last section summarizes the main ndings and
concludes. The proofs can be found in Appendix.
2 The Model
This paper builds on Gale [14] and Lahiri and Puhakka [16] by considering a pure exchange
overlapping generations model. Complex dynamics and endogenous cycles have been shown
to emerge in overlapping generation models with production and/or a variety of dierent
assumptions concerning market imperfections.4 Here we abstract from technology to rein-
force the point this study tries to make: with habits, dierences in dynamics and in steady
states properties need not be driven by the production side of the economy, but rather by
the modeling choice of preferences alone. Economic activity takes place over innite discrete
time. Each generation lives for two periods and has perfect foresight. Agents are endowed
with w1 units of the single good when young and with w2 units when old. Utility is derived
from consumption in both periods. However, due to the presence of habit formation, utility
4See Boldrin and Woodford (1990).
4of a given level of consumption when old depends on consumption when young.5 Formally:
V (c1;c2) = u(c1) +  u(c1;c2;
) (1)
where 
 2 (0;1) denotes the strength of habits in the instantaneous utility function and  is
the discount factor. We assume that the function u(:) is well behaved, i.e. strictly increasing,
strictly concave, homogeneous, and twice continuously dierentiable. If one considers SH,
then preferences are typically given by u(c1;c2;
) = u(c2   
c1) as in Lahiri and Puhakka





1). Regardless of the specication considered, the importance of past consumption in
determining the utility derived by the \eective" consumption is increasing with 
.
Each agent maximizes utility subject to budget constraints; c1 = w1   st when young,
and c2 = w2 + Rtst when old. st and Rt denote savings when young and the gross nominal
interest rate on savings at time t, respectively. In what follows, we rst study the concavity,
the homothetic properties and the steady state equilibria that emerge in each case. We then
explore the local dynamic properties of the equilibria under the two habit specications.
2.1 Preferences
One of the most important dierences across alternative habit specications is in terms of
their implications on the underlying preferences. Alonso-Carrera, Caball e, and Raurich [2]
show that when habits are introduced multiplicatively in a capital accumulation model, the
consumers' objective function might fail to be concave. In this paper, we nd a similar result
for pure exchange overlapping generation models as stated in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 (Concavity) Consider a pure exchange two-period lived overlapping gen-
erations model. Then: (i) under SH persistence, the utility function is strictly concave in
consumption, and (ii) under MH persistence, concavity is not always ensured.
Proof. See Appendix.
5Specically, both the absolute level of consumption in the second period and the change in consumption
between the two periods are important. The more the consumption when young, the more consumption in
the following period is required to derive a given level of utility.
5Proposition 1 implies that one needs to be extra cautious when solving for the con-
sumption plan that maximizes consumers' utility under MH. The next proposition outlines
another crucial implication in terms of the savings function resulting from the consumer's
problem. The adoption of MH or SH can greatly aect the savings behavior, even if other
fundamentals remain the same.
Proposition 2 (Homotheticity) If the instantaneous utility function u(:) is homogeneous
of degree n, then the SH specication yields homothetic preferences whereas the MH speci-
cation does not.
Proof. See Appendix.
It is well known that, in overlapping generations models, the saving function is linear
in income/endowments if the lifetime utility function is homothetic.6 Thus, we expect to
observe substantial dierences in underlying dynamics between SH and MH specications.
This particular comparison is analyzed in section 2.3.
2.2 Steady State Equilibria
In this section, we show that if one adopts SH then there exists a unique monetary steady
state while under MH multiple monetary equilibria cannot be ruled out. The optimal savings
function for a young agent in this model with MH is dened as follows:
s







Thus, the implicit function for optimal savings can be written as:




















)s + w2   
w1) = 0: (4)
6REFERENCE.
6To close the model and analyze the steady states, we introduce an outside asset into the
economy. Following Lahiri and Puhakka [16], we assume that there is a government that
borrows from and lends to the public. This approach is clearly equivalent to injecting
valueless at money in the economy. Government liabilities in period t are denoted by bt,
and the real decit by dt. The government's budget constraint for period t is then given by:
dt + Rt 1bt 1 = bt: (5)
If bt > 0, then the economy is in the Samuelson case according to the terminology rst coined
by Gale [14]. Instead, if bt < 0, then the economy is in the Classical case. In Proposition 4
and Lemma 1 below, we derive a general result on the dynamics under MH and SH in the
classical case. The analysis and the numerical examples of section 2.3 consider both cases.
Asset market equilibrium requires that bt = st for all t. Setting the government's decit
to zero, the law of motion for this economy is dened as follows:
st+1 = stRt (6)
which also represents the oer curve for this economy.
Using a general instantaneous utility function does not always yield an explicit expres-
sion for optimal savings, nor the gross interest elasticity of savings. Thus, it is not possible
to explicitly analyze equation (6). However, we can characterize a crucial dierence be-
tween the two alternative specications in a general setting where no explicit functional
form assumptions regarding the utility are made. The following proposition states that the
standard results on uniqueness do not necessarily apply to the case with MH. This result on
the uniqueness of equilibria will then have crucial implications for the local dynamics of the
economy.
Proposition 3 (Uniqueness) Under SH, there always exists a unique monetary steady
state. Under MH, on the other hand, multiplicity of monetary steady states cannot be ruled
out.
Proof. See Appendix.
The economic intuition behind this result is related to the possible lack of gross sub-
7stitutability in the MH case. It is well known that when consumption in the rst and the
second periods are weak gross substitutes, then the steady state is unique.7 This condition
can be veried by studying the sign of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES).
Under the subtractive specication, IES is always positive, whereas under the multiplicative































The crucial term in 	 is @2V
@c1@c2, if it is negative then gross substitutability could break down.





00(c2   c1) > 0:






















where the sign of this expression depends on the underlying parameter values of the model.
Under intertemporally non-separable preferences, the elasticity of substitution between
current and future consumption is time variant. However, dierent functional forms for the
outer 
ow utility imply dierent degrees of risk aversion. A subtractive specication implies
that consumption in the rst and the second periods are always gross substitutes, whereas
this is not necessarily true when a multiplicative formulation is adopted. Due to lack of gross
substitutability, it is possible for multiple monetary steady states to arise. This clearly has
important implications on the dynamics of the economy.
In the next section, we highlight the dierences between MH and SH modeling choices
using numerical examples for the Samuelsonian and Classical cases as well as for dierent
strengths of habits.
7change reference See, for example, Azariadis, Bullard, and Ohanian [?].
82.3 Dynamics
One clear message of the previous section is that we should expect dierences in the local
dynamics between the two specications due to homotheticity or lack thereof. Before we
proceed, let us establish a general result for the classical case which is a direct consequence
of a theorem by Gale [14]. The following proposition together with Proposition 2 suggest
that alternative habit formulations can yield drastically dierent results in terms of dynamic
indeterminacy in the classical case.
Proposition 4 (Gale, 1973) In the classical case, if the utility function is either (i) sep-
arable, or (ii) homothetic then there exist a unique path approaching the steady state given
an initial condition.
Proof. See the proof of Theorem 5 in Gale ([14], p.25).
Weak gross substitutability implies that, if it exists, there is at most one equilibrium
price sequence which converges to the steady state. Proposition 4 and Lemma 1 suggest
that this is not the case for MH.
Lemma 1 In the classical case, SH lead to determinate dynamic equilibrium whereas MH
display dynamic indeterminacy.
Proof. Recall that both habit specications imply non-separable preferences. In addition,
Proposition 2 showed that preferences are non-homothetic under MH while they are homo-
thetic under SH. These facts together with Proposition 4 above completes the proof.











where  is the gross interest rate elasticity of savings. Since we cannot obtain a closed
form solution for the oer curve under MH nor SH, it is not possible to study its behavior
analytically. For this reason, we provide numerical examples that show how the dynamics
can dier in the Samuelsonian as well as in the Classical case. In particular, we show that
multiple monetary steady states are possible under MH and endogenous volatility is possible
under SH and MH, but not necessarily at the same time and for the same parameter values.
9For our numerical examples, let us consider the class of preferences with hyperbolic
absolute risk aversion (HARA). This class includes as special cases the family of utility
functions with a constant coecient of relative risk aversion (CRRA), the one with a constant
absolute risk aversion (CARA), and the quadratic utility. The HARA family is commonly
used in the nance literature8. This fact is relevant since the two seminal papers of Abel [1]
and Constantinides [12], which adopt the alternative functional forms of habit persistence
to explain the risk premium, are widely cited in the nancial literature. Moreover, Carroll
and Kimball [8] show how CARA and CRRA specications imply savings behavior that is
qualitatively very dierent from the one corresponding to a HARA formulation. In particular,
Carroll and Kimball [8] show that under HARA preferences consumption rules are concave,
which is consistent with the marginal propensity to consume out of wealth or transitory
income declines with the level of wealth, but linear when CARA and CRRA specications
are considered. Thus the underlying choice of preferences is not innocuous. The utility












where A and  are real numbers, and  > 0. Incorporating MH in the HARA family yields



























Typically, to characterize the dynamical properties of this economy, we need to determine
the slope of the oer curve at each of the steady states. The marginal rate of substitution at
the initial endowment point should be studied as well. However, the HARA utility function
may not always be dened at the origin. Formally, the utility function is dened only when
A + c
  0. By substituting the budget constraint for each period into the respective 
ow












  0 (B2)
Therefore, these additional constraints need to be taken into account when building the oer
curve.
Throughout our numerical analysis we set  = 0:55 which corresponds to an annual
discount rate of 0.976 when the \generation" considered lasts 25 years. Moreover, we choose
the following parameter values for the utility function:  = 0:39, A =  1, and  = 0:79. The
ndings corresponding to this specic parameterization are not unique and similar qualitative
properties are found with dierent parameter values. In particular, we nd that by varying
the strength of habits, 
, the dynamical properties of the steady state can be greatly aected.
The tables corrsponding to the examples provide information regarding steady state
allocations for savings (ss:s:), consumption when young (cs:s:
1 ) and old (cs:s
2 ), the gross interest
rate elasticity of savings () and the slope of the oer curve evaluated at the steady states,
(1+ 1
). Finally, our tables also report the principal minor (PM) and the determinant of the
associated Hessian at steady state (detH) as well. We do so in light of Proposition 1 which
warns of the potential lack of concavity under the MH case. We want to be sure that the
steady states that we nd are equilibria indeed.
2.3.1 Examples for the Samuelson Case
In this subsection we examine the consequences of increasing the strength of habits. Our
examples show that as we increase the strength of habits the number of monetary equilibria
and the corresponding local dynamics of the two habit specications can be quite dierent.
Example 1 When 
 = 0:5, w1 = 3, and w2 = 1, we nd a unique monetary steady state
for both habit specications. These steady states have similar local dynamics.
Table 1 indicates that stability properties of the steady states are qualitatively similar
across specications. Both monetary steady states are locally unstable and endogenous
volatility is not possible because (1 + 1
) is greater than one. The stylized oer curves












Table 1: Unique equilibria for the two specications and similar dynamics.
Figure 1 here.
The oer curve plotted in Figure 1(a) suggests that SH introduces a source of indeter-
minacy, which results from the fact that parts of the oer curve are multi-valued. In other
words, under SH we nd that for a particular st, there might be more than one st+1; thus
generating dynamic indeterminacy.
Example 2 When 
 = 0:7, w1 = 3, and w2 = 1, we nd a unique monetary steady state













Table 2: Unique Equilibria for the two specications, but dierent dynamics.
As we can see from Table 2, increasing the strength of habits changes the local dynamics.
Both monetary steady states are locally unstable but the corresponding eigenvalue for MH
is positive and greater than one, thus endogenous volatility is not possible. On the other
hand, nondamped oscillations are observed under SH. In contrast to the previous example,
the local dynamics of these two economies are vastly dierent. The stylized oer curves
corresponding to the two cases of this example are shown in Figure 2.
12Figure 2 here.
Figure 2 also reveals that dynamic indeterminacy is not possible since the oer curve is
not multivalued for both SH and MH specications.
Example 3 When 
 = 0:85, w1 = 3, and w2 = 1, we nd two monetary steady states under
MH and a unique monetary steady state under SH. Local dynamics associated with the two
dierent set of steady states are quite dierent.
SH MH
Steady State Steady State I Steady State II
ss:s: 1.610 0.445 2.447
cs:s:
1 1.389 2.554 0.553
cs:s
2 2.610 1.445 3.447
 -0.067 0.542 0.045
(1 + 1
) -13.896 2.845 22.986
PM -0.374 -0.057 -7.822
detH 0.038 0.015 0.214
Table 3: Multiplicity of Equilibria for the MH case, but not for the SH case.
Table 3 shows that as we further increase the strength of habits multiple steady states are
possible when MH are considered. This situation is non-generic since the only way to have
multiple monetary steady states is for consumers to be indierent between two (or more)
levels of savings when R= 1 holds. In other words, dierent local maxima in the consumer's
optimization problem must yield exactly the same utility level, which is clearly a non-generic
situation. Even though this is the case, it is important to highlight that SH can never support
multiple steady states as illustrated in section 2.2 above. Table 3 also highlights that all
the steady states are unstable and that the steady state under SH yields endogenous arising
volatility. The stylized oer curves corresponding to this example are shown in Figure 3.
Notice that this time it is the economy under MH to exhibit indeterminacy since a part of
the associated oer curve is multi-valued around the lower savings steady state.
Figure 3 here.
Example 3 also illustrates that sunspot equilibria may be observed under MH. In par-
ticular, sunspot equilibria can be constructed as a lottery between two deterministic steady
13states as in Cass and Shell [11]. Furthermore, since multiple steady states may exist under
MH, bifurcation phenomena are possible as we vary the strength of habits. By changing 
,
we can move from a situation with a unique steady state to another where multiple steady
states are possible.
2.3.2 Do endowment proles matter?
In a recent paper, Bunzel [5] argues that, regardless of whether one adopts SH or MH, the
dynamical properties of the pure exchange economy are very similar. Bunzel focuses on
an outer utility function which is CRRA and considers zero second period endowments for
tractability. In this subsection we want to determine if Bunzels irrelevance results are driven
by the specic choice of the utility function of the particular endowment prole considered.
The following example shows that Bunzels results are driven by the choice of the functional
form of the outer utility. When HARA utility functions are considered the MH specication
can indeed aect the qualitative properties of the dynamical system even when there is no
second period endowment.
Example 4 When 
 = 0:85, w1 = 3, and w2 = 0, we nd two monetary steady states under
MH and a unique monetary steady state under SH. Local dynamics associated with the two
dierent set of steady states are quite dissimilar.
SH MH
Steady State Steady State I Steady State II
ss:s: 1.956 1.225 2.391
cs:s:
1 1.043 1.774 0.608
cs:s
2 1.956 1.225 2.391
 -0.204 -0.139 0.185
(1 + 1
) -3.887 -6.183 6.394
PM -0.737 -0.065 -2.162
detH 0.148 0.020 0.070
Table 4: Multiplicity of Equilibria for the MH case, but not for the SH case.
As we can see from Table 4, all steady states are unstable under both habit specica-
tions. Moreover, the local dynamics around the steady state under SH display nondamped
oscillations. This is also the case for steady state I under MH. Steady state II has diverg-
ingmonotonic dynamics instead.
142.3.3 Examples for the Classical Case
In this subsection we check whether the dierences in the dynamics for the two specications
are just observed in Samuelsonian economies. We nd this not to be the case. Profound
discrepancies in the local dynamics are possible even in the Classical Case when savings are
negative.
Example 5 When 
 = 0:5, w1 = 0, and w2 = 3, we nd a unique monetary steady state












Table 5: Unique equilibria for SH and MH.
Under SH we nd endogenous arising volatility that vanishes over time and under MH we
observe monotonic dynamics converging to the steady state.
Example 6 When 
 = 0:85, w1 = 0, and w2 = 3, we nd two monetary steady states under
MH and a unique monetary steady state under SH. Local dynamics associated with the two
dierent set of steady states are quite dierent.
SH MH
Steady State Steady State I Steady State II
ss:s: -1.043 -0.608 -1.774
cs:s:
1 1.043 0.608 1.774
cs:s
2 1.956 2.391 1.225
 -0.609 -0.198 -1.249
(1 + 1
) -0.641 -4.047 0.199
PM -0.737 -2.162 -0.065
detH 0.148 0.070 0.020
Table 6: Multiplicity of Equilibria for the MH case, but not for the SH case.
15As we increase the strength of habits, it is interesting to note that whereas the steady
state for SH is stable, the MH case has two steady states with opposite stability properties.
Steady State I is unstable and exhibits nondamped oscillations. Steady state II, on the other
hand, is stable with converging monotone dynamics.
The point we want to convey with all the previous examples is that stability and dy-
namical properties of an economy can change drastically as we vary the strength of habits
for both SH and MH. This result is in line with the ndings of Lahiri and Puhakka [16]
for the subtractive framework. They show that switches between a Samuelsonian and a
classical economy are possible as the strength of habits varies. As habits become stronger,
dierent responses in savings behavior across MH and SH cases are possible. The response
of savings to a variation in the gross interest rate depends crucially on the specication of
habits. In general, with SH, the marginal utility of consumption when old is decreasing in c1
at a decreasing rate. However, this might not be the case if we adopt the MH specication.
In the latter case, the marginal utility of eective consumption when old is decreasing in c1
at an increasing or at a decreasing rate depending on parameter values. This implies that,
agents might value consumption growth more in the multiplicative specication than in the
subtractive specication.
3 Conclusion
The objective of this paper is to examine the dierences between two alternative formu-
lations used in the habit persistence literature. In particular, we explore the consequences
of adopting multiplicative versus subtractive habits in terms of multiplicity of steady states,
dynamic indeterminacy, and local dynamics. We nd that choosing MH as opposed to SH
can result in very dierent outcomes in a pure exchange two period lived overlapping genera-
tions model. First, we show that in general under MH the optimization problem may not be
concave and that preferences are not homothetic. Second, we nd that multiple monetary
steady states cannot be ruled out under MH. Third, the local dynamic properties of the
economy crucially depend on the type of habits considered as well as their strength.
Finally, it is worthy to point out that we did not fully explore the dierences in the
global dynamics of the two alternative specications. However, since we nd discontinuities
16in the oer curve under MH but not under SH because of the non-concavity issue, our
educated guess is that SH and MH could yield very dierent time series patterns. Thus, the
results on the irrelevance of modeling habits by Bunzel [5] do not hold under a more general
specication of preferences.
Our paper suggests that there are important dierences on how savings behave across
the two most commonly adopted habit specications. The choice of how to model savings
behavior in the presence of habits is not as innocuous as it might seem. Hence, the predictions
and policy prescriptions based on the two types of habit persistence modeling choices could
be quite dierent.
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Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. (i) The principal minor of the Hessian associated with the SH specication is given
by u00(c1) + 
2u00(c2   
c1). Note that this expression is always negative. The determinant
is given by u00(c1)u00(c2   
c1) which is always positive. Therefore, the Hessian is negative
denite and concavity is insured.
(ii) Repeating the process for the case of MH, we nd that the rst principal minor is negative



























































































Therefore, the Hessian is negative semi-denite only under certain parameter restrictions.
In order for the reader to be sure that these conditions are violated in some cases we
need to provide at least one explicit example where the objective is not concave. Con-

























. Let w1 = 3, w2 = 1, 
 = 0:75,  = 0:39, A =  1,  = 0:79, and
 = 0:55. Then for st 2 [0:974;2:289] there is non concavity.
Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. It it sucient to show that the von NeumannMorgenstern utility function in the
subtractive case is homogeneous of degree n, while the one in the multiplicative case is not.
Let  > 0 be a scalar. If we multiply the rst and second period consumption by  in the
subtractive case we obtain: u(c1) + u(c2   
c1) = u(c1) + u((c2   
c1)). Assuming
that the felicity function u(:) is homogeneous of degree n, then the overall utility function is
clearly homothetic, i.e. nu(c1) + nu(c2   
c1) = nV (c1;c2).
For the multiplicative case, instead, we show that the utility function is not homogeneous


























Proof of Proposition 3





)s + w2   
w1) = u
0(w1   s)
Since both the left and the right hand side of the rst order condition (FOC) are continuous





00(w1   s) > 0
@(R + 
)u0((R + 
)s + w2   
w1)
@s




)s + w2   
w1) < 0
Note that the second expression (derivative for the left hand side of the FOC) is strictly
decreasing in s and the rst expression (derivative for the right hand side of the FOC) is
strictly increasing in s. By the intermediate value theorem, there exists a unique level of
optimal savings, ^ s. However, the same conclusion cannot be drawn under MH. The implicit















While the right hand side is strictly increasing in s, the sign of the slope for the left hand




























































R(w1   s) + 





Therefore, we cannot rule out the possibilities for multiple or a continuum of equilibrium













































Figure 3: SH case (a) vs. MH case (b) for 
 = 0:85
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